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NOTES 
Congressional Apportionment: The Unproductive 
Search for Standards and Remedies 
The increasingly complex problems of elucidating congressional 
apportionment standards and granting appropriate relief when vot-
ing rights have been materially diluted were again brought to the 
fore in the recent districting decision of Calkins v. Hare.1 This fed-
eral district court decision is illustrative of the uncertainty caused by 
the Supreme Court's opinion in the landmark case of Wesberry v. 
Sanders.2 Although Wesberry resolved two previously contested 
issues by ruling that congressional apportionment disputes are sus-
ceptible of judicial determination3 and by setting a standard of 
population equality in delimiting districts,4 two associated questions 
were left unanswered. First, even though Wes berry established that 
districts are to be defined in terms of practicable equality, the Court 
did not indicate what latitude, if any, would be acceptable.5 Second, 
the opinion is void of any suggestions for remedial action to be 
applied in those cases where a state's districting scheme is found to 
be outside the bounds of practicable equality. 
In Calkins, plaintiffs brought an action in a three-judge federal 
district court contesting the constitutionality of the 1963 Michigan 
congressional apportionment act6 and seeking an injunction restrain-
ing state officials from conducting elections pursuant to the challenged 
statute. In light of Wesberry, plaintiffs urged that the disparity in 
population among the districts was contrary to article I, section 2 of 
the Constitution, which provides that members of the House of 
Representatives shall be chosen "by the People of the several States." 
Data from the 1960 census7 disclosed a ratio of 1.6 to I between the 
most populous district with 494,068 persons and the least populous 
1. 228 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich. 1964). 
2. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). For a comprehensive discussion of the history of congressional 
districting cases, see Carpenter, Wesberry v. Sanders: A Case of Oversimplification, 9 
VII.I.. L. REv. 415 (1964); Comment, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 98 (1963); Note, 13 AM. U.L. 
REv. 200 (1964); Note, 15 MERCER L. REv. 504 (1964). 
3. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). The suit had been dismissed in the 
court below, Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962), on the ground 
that Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), precluded judicial review of assaults on 
congressional districting as involving "political questions." Prior to Wesberry v. 
Sanders, considerable doubt existed as to whether Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), 
the landmark case involving apportionment of state legislatures, was decisive on the 
justiciability of questions regarding inequality in congressional districts. Emerson, 
Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 69 (1962). 
4. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 
5. "The Court's 'as nearly as is practicable' formula sweeps a host of questions 
under the rug. How great a difference between the population of various districts 
within a state is tolerable?" Id. at 21 n.4 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
6. Mich. Pub. Act No. 249 Gune 13, 1963). 
7. All ratios presented herein are.based on 1960 census figures. 
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with 305,984. Although the defendant contended that the voting 
population, rather than the total population, of each district was the 
relevant comparative statistic, the court considered it clear that Wes-
berry contemplated use of the total population of each district.8 On 
final hearing, the court unanimously found that the debasement of 
voting power in some districts and its enhancement in others was 
unconstitutional and, over the dissent of one judge, granted plain-
tiff's motion for an injunction.9 The decree provided that, pending 
enactment of substitute legislation, congressmen from Michigan 
shall be nominated and elected from the state at large.10 
It would appear that precise equality in population among con-
gressional districts is not mandatory.11 However, Calkins reflects the 
considerable amount of frustration in the lower courts as they at-
tempt to define permissible inequality.12 The difficulty arises from 
the fact that these tribunals have been left, unassisted by the Supreme 
Court, to fabricate a mathematical formula from the meager mate-
rial of an interdict on "invidious discrimination"13 and a mandate 
that districts must be practicably equal in population. To accomplish 
this task, the judiciary has utilized a myriad of comparisons to delin-
eate the amount of disproportion among districts in question. Al-
though the court in Calkins discussed the average divergence from 
uniformity and the absolute difference in population between 
adjoining districts, it was largely impressed by the magnitude of the 
ratio showing the dissimilarity between the most and least inhabited 
districts. This latter technique has been utilized in numerous recent 
decisions, and it provides a convenient and consistent statistic to 
show, by way of empirical analysis, how inconclusive has been the 
pattern of the post-Wesberry cases. 
B. But see Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I, 21 n.4 
(1964). Pending before the House Committee on the Judiciary is a proposed constitu• 
tional amendment providing that Representatives in Congress shall be apportioned 
among the states on the basis of registered voters. H.J. Res. 1053, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1964). 
9. Complete equity in apportionment is obtainable only by some system of pro-
portional representations. See Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical 
Quagmire: The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH, L. REv. 107, 114 n.35 (1962); 
Laughlin, Proportional Representation: It Can Cure Our Apportionment Ills, 49 
A.B.A.J. 1065 (1963). 
10. Calkins v. Hare, 228 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Mich. 1964). The success of this 
decree is evidenced by the fact that the Michigan legislature repealed the invalid 
provision, Mich. Pub. Act No. 249 Gune 13, 1963), and replaced it with MICH, STAT, 
ANN. § 4.22 (1964), effective Aug. 28, 1964. 
11. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Calkins v. Hare, supra note 10, at 
829. Relocation and growth of the population also preclude exact equality of districts. 
See Schattschneider, Urbanization and Reapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 7 (1962). 
12. "It may be argued that now there is a clear standard, but the debate as to 
what is 'as near as practicable' continues." Calkins v. Hare, supra note 10, at 833 
(O'Sullivan, J., dissenting). 
13. Invidious discrimination is that which is arbitrary and not reasonably justifiable. 
Israel, supra note 9, at 109. 
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Wesberry was brought before the Supreme Court on facts show-
ing that the ratio between the largest and smallest districts in Geor-
gia was 3.03 to 1.14 The Court held that this discrepancy represented 
an unconstitutional dilution of voting power in the smaller district.115 
The only additional "guideline" offered by the Supreme Court to 
date is a per curiam affirmation approving a district court decision 
in Texas which held that a disparity of 4.4 to I is invidiously dis-
criminatory and unconstitutional.16 It is manifest that this incon-
gruous differential offered no clue as to how nearly equal districts 
must be to comport with the Court's general requirements in 
Wesberry. 
Thus, the principal case, which found a population dissimilarity 
of 1.6 to I to be invalid, and a district court decision in Meeks v. 
Anderson,11 following less than a month later, represent the first 
significant refinements of the unconstitutional variance found in 
Wesberry. In Meeks, it was held that a ratio of 1.44 to I between 
the most and least populous districts in Kansas was too large.18 In 
emphasizing that only one factor, population, may be taken into 
account in apportioning, the language of the court was so strong 
that it cast some doubt on the accuracy of previous generalities that 
districts do not have to be precisely equal in population.19 The 
Supreme Court, however, indicated soon thereafter that, at least as 
regards state legislative apportionment, it is a practical impossibility 
to arrange districts so that each one has an identical number of resi-
dents and that mathematical precision is hardly a workable consti-
tutional requirement.20 On the strength of this precedent, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court was of the opinion that a discrepancy of 
1.2 to I was not so great as to require a finding of gross disproportion 
in representation or invidious discrimination between the respective 
voters in the state's two districts.21 The force of this statement is 
impaired, however, by the alternative ground offered as dispositive 
14. Georgia's fifth congressional district included 823,680 persons compared with 
only 272,154 in the ninth district. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
15. Id. at 4. Four days after the decision was rendered, the Georgia General As-
sembly reapportioned the state's districts which now range in population from 329,738 
to 455,575 persons, a ratio of 1.38 to I. Comment, 35 MISS. L.J. 402,416 (1964). 
16. Bush v. Martin, 224 F. Supp. 499 (S.D. Tex. 1963), afj'd per curiam, 376 U.S. 
222 (1964). The largest district included 951,527 persons compared with only 216,371 
in the smallest. 
17. 229 F. Supp. 271 (D. Kan. 1964) (decided April 24). 
18. The disparity ran from a low oE 373,583 persons in the fifth district to a high 
of 539,592 in the first. Id. at 272. 
19. E.g., Clark v. Carter, 218 F. Supp. 448, 451 (E.D. Ky. 1963); Thigpen v. Meyers, 
211 F. Supp. 826,831 (W.D. Wash. 1962), appeal pending, 376 U.S. 902 (1964); Wisconsin 
v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp. 183, 187 (W .D. Wis. 1962); Lisco v. McNicbols, 208 F. 
Supp. 471, 476 (D. Colo. 1962). See note 11 supra. 
20. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
21. Levitt v. Maynard, 202 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1964). The first district included 331,818 
persons compared with 275,103 in the second district. 
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of the case; the court asserted that even if the apportionment were 
thought to be constitutionally defective, it was too near elections to 
grant injunctive relief.22 The petition for declaratory judgment was 
continued pending legislative action. Thus, it is uncertain how 
much weight can be attributed to the court's initial opinion that a 
discrepancy of the magnitude of 1.2 to I is not discriminatory. In 
addition to the fact that the above results do not represent binding 
law outside the respective jurisdictions that produced them, it is 
manifest that they have only limited value as precedent enunciating 
definite and refined standards for resolving future districting 
contests.23 
No less important than the establishment of tolerance standards 
is the quest for an appropriate solution when an apportionment 
scheme is found invalid. From a practical viewpoint, it appears that 
positive relief should come from the judiciary. Congressional action 
has been ineffective in producing even approximate equality among 
districts. In addition, the prospect of affirmative action by the state 
legislatures, at least until recently, has been remote. 
Congressional abdication in this area· is clearly demonstrated by 
history. From 1789 to 1842, a number of states regularly elected their 
congressmen at large.24 Thereafter, Congress promulgated certain 
guidelines, the general import of which was to promote the district 
system, eliminate multiple-member constituencies, and require, at 
least pro forma, that the districts not only be reasonably equal in 
population but also that they be composed of "contiguous and com-
pact territory."25 With minor variations, these basic requirements 
were re-enacted by Congress every ten years through I 911.26 However, 
in 1920, Congress declined to reapportion after the census,27 and 
finally, in 1929, the requirements of equality, contiguity, and com-
pactness were intentionally omitted.28 Evolving from this 1929 legis-
22. New Hampshire primaries are held on the second Tuesday in September. 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 56:4. The case was decided July 16, 1964. 
23. It is interesting to note that in construing the equal protection clause prior to 
Wesberry, the Missouri Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional viola-
tion where districts varied from 378,499 to 506,854 persons. This gives a ratio of 1.34 
to 1, which is approximately in the middle of the gap between the Meeks and New 
Hampshire cases. Preisler v. Reames, 362 S.W .2d 552 (Mo. 1962). 
24. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: .The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543, 
550 (1954). 
25. In the election of 1842, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, and New Hampshire 
ignored the newly enacted statute, 5 Stat. 491 (1842), which required election of 
representatives by districts. Although objection was made as to this impropriety, the 
Representatives were seated. 1 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
§§ 309-10 (1907). 
26. For a comprehensive discussion of early districting legislation, see Wechsler, 
supra note 24, at 550. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 7 (1932). But see Black, Inequities in Districting 
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lation as amended, the present system provides for automatic redistri-
bution of representation among the states after each census in 
addition to a procedure for electing Representatives when a state 
fails to preseribe new districts following a change in its allotted 
delegation.29 With this minor exception, Congress has left the actual 
mechanics of the districting system entirely within the states' 
discretion. 
Only twice has the seating of a member been challenged on 
grounds that his district did not reflect the required standard of 
equality.30 No action was taken in either instance, however, because 
the matter was considered too delicate.31 There was a similarly un-
eventful occurrence in 1951 when President Truman, in his mes-
sage to Congress, outlined certain criteria for apportioning dis-
tricts. 32 Basically his proposal was to restore the requirement of 
practicable population equality among districts, which he defined 
to preclude deviations in excess of fifty thousand above or below a 
norm of 350 thousand persons per district. 
The inability of state legislatures to correct abuses found in 
congressional apportionment is apparent from the fact that inequal-
ity of representation in those bodies exceeds that found among con-
gressional districts.83 Thus, the rural interests, which are frequently 
overrepresented in Congress, enjoy an even larger margin of voting 
power in the state legislatures and thereby dominate the very politi-
cal machinery by which congressional malapportionment could be 
cured.84 
The judiciary could, of course, perpetuate this dilemma by 
declining to act.35 The majority in Calkins, however, was impressed 
by the perplexity confronting the complaining voters and viewed 
its responsibility as extending beyond affording declaratory judg-
ment; consequently, a decree was issued enjoining election officials 
from enforcing the invalid districting statute and calling for elec-
tions at large, pending enactment of substitute legislation.86 This 
for Congress, 72 YALE L.J. 13, 18·21 (1962), where the author contends that the Court 
misconstrued congressional intent. 
29. 46 Stat. 26 (1929), as amended, 55 Stat. 761 (1941), 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1958). 
30. Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 
1057, 1093-94 (1958). 
31. Id. at 1094. 
32. 97 CONG. REc. 114 (1951). 
33. See Goldberg, The Statistics of Malapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 90 (1962). 
34. Traditional recognition given to area and other nonpopulation factors has 
greatly inflated the relative influence of rural voters as compared to urbanites and 
more recently to suburbanites. See Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How to "Sear the Conscience" 
of Legislators, 72 YALE L.J. 23 (1962). Potential relief from the rural imbalance now 
exists as a result of Supreme Court rulings that both houses of state legislatures must 
be apportioned on a population basis. See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 
(1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964). 
35. See Calkins v. Hare, 228 F. Supp. 824, 829 (E.D. Mich. 1964). 
36. Id. at 830. 
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disposition, although severely censured in some quarters,87 offers 
much to recommend it. Concededly, the ordering of an election at 
large of a state legislature would violate those state constitutions 
which provide that state legislators must be elected by substate 
units,38 in which event either there would be no de jure legislature 
or the legitimacy of the legislature would rest solely on a court 
decree.30 However, this same reasoning does not apply to the United 
States House of Representatives. Congress would continue to con-
form to the United States Constitution even though its members 
were elected at large from the respective states.40 In addition, the 
command to conduct at-large elections may be phrased in simple 
terms, and all the inescapable political decisions are confined to the 
legislature, which is the traditional forum for such matters. Further-
more, the probability of redistricting is high since the recalcitrants, 
presumably a minority interest,41 would incur the greatest propor-
tionate loss in an election at large. Finally, recourse to ordering a 
state to elect its entire congressional delegation at large does not rest 
on untried ground, having been adopted twice by the United States 
Supreme Court42 and once by the Virginia court.43 In all three 
instances, the legislatures responded by reapportioning before the 
next election.44 
At-large elections appear particularly attractive when compared 
to the principal alternatives of inaction or permitting the courts 
themselves to frame all the changes necessary in the apportionment 
system.45 Most courts have refused to undertake directly the task of 
redrawing a state's districts,46 although this view has not been 
adopted with unanimity.47 Notwithstanding the general merits of 
ordering elections at large, however, additional expense and incon-
venience to both candidates and voters makes this solution increas-
37. E.g., Gong v. Bryant, 230 F. Supp. 917 (S.D. Fla. 1964). See Comment, 39 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 264, 266 n.14 (1964). 
38. Black, supra note 28, at 15. 
39. Ibid. 
40. See Alsup v. Mayhall, 208 F. Supp. 713 (S.D. Ala. 1962); White v. Frink, 274 
Ala. 49, 145 So. 2d 435 (1962). 
41. See text accompanying note 34 supra. 
42. Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
43. Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932). 
44. Lewis, supra note 30, at 1088. Affirmative action was also achieved by the decree 
in Calkins. See note 10 supra. 
45. Such an assertion of power by a court would be met with a negative reaction. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, "Surely a Federal District Court could not itself re-
map the State ••.. " Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 328 (1962) (dissenting opinion). But 
see Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional 
Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REv. 209, 228-30 (1964). 
46. E.g., Maryland Citizens Comm. for Fair Congressional Redistricting, Inc. v. 
Tawes, 228 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1964); Bush v. Martin, 224 F. Supp. 499 (S.D. 
Tex. 1963), afj'd per curiam, 376 U.S. 222 (1964). 
47. E.g., Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149 (W .D. Okla. 1963), afj'd sub nom., 
Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964); Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 
1962), aff'd sub nom., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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ingly less desirable as the election date approaches.48 In a recent 
Supreme Court decision,49 it was suggested that a court should at 
least consider the proximity of an approaching election and the 
mechanics of state election laws before awarding immediate relief. 
Another cause of dilatory judicial response is the belief that the 
legislature will eradicate the problem after it is informed of the 
inequity.50 Unfortunately, this deference has often proved too opti-
mistic, as some states have failed to respond even after repeated 
admonitions from the courts. 51 
The enormity of the existing problem is apparent from the ob-
servation of Mr. Justice Harlan that, under one potentially accept-
able formulation, all but thirty-seven congressional districts are 
outside the requirement of practicable equality.52 In addition, pop-
ulation projections indicate that the current disproportion will in-
crease as people continue to concentrate in urban and suburban 
complexes.53 Therefore, it can be seen from both major remaining 
deficiencies in the judicial attempt to promote reapportionment-
uncertain standards and inadequate remedies-that there is an 
urgent need for Congress to exercise its general supervisory power 
over the elections of its members. Failure to act cannot be justified 
on grounds of absence of authority. The drafters of the Constitution 
anticipated the possibility of malapportionment54 and provided fed-
eral power to overcome it.55 Recent pragmatic experience with the 
application of this doctrine clearly demonstrates that effective imple-
mentation depends upon Congress providing a legislative vehicle by 
which transgressions may be uniformly detected and alleviated.56 
48. See, e.g., Gong v. Bryant, 230 F. Supp. 917 (S.D. Fla. 1964); Wisconsin v. Zimmer-
man, 209 F. Supp. 183 (W .D. Wis. 1962); White v. Anderson, 394 P .2d 333 (Colo. 1964); 
Guntert v. Richardson, 394 P .2d 444 (Hawaii 1964). 
49. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964). 
50. E.g., Meeks v. Anderson, 229 F. Supp. 271 (D. Kan. 1964); Levitt v. Maynard, 
202 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1964). 
51. See Thigpen v. Meyers, 231 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Wash. 1964); Maryland Citizens 
Comm. for Fair Congressional Redistricting, Inc. v. Tawes, 228 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 
1964). 
52. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 21 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
53. See Schattschneider, supra note 11. 
54. Lewis, supra note 30, at 1072. 
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, 
except as to the Places of chusing Senators ..•. " 
56. Subsequent to the Wesberry decision, on February 17, 1964, several measures 
were brought before the House of Representatives: H.R. 11650, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1964)°, providing that districts shall not vary more than 20% from the average of all 
the districts in the state; H.R. 11844, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), providing that no 
district shall vary more than 15% from the average of all the districts in the state; 
H.R. 12309, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), providing for a mid-decade census in 1965 to 
reapportion the House. 
